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5.1

CULTURE, PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND
INDIVIDUALISM: THEIR RELATIONSHIPS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL GROWTH AND
WELL-BEING
Valery I. Chirkov

The recent research and theorizing in cross-cultural social psychology have raised
several interesting and conceptually important issues about the role of autonomy, selfdetermination and freedom of choice in different cultures and regarding the role of these
factors in human functioning within various cultural contexts (Ahuvia, 2001; Inghilleri,
1999; Iyengar & DeVoe, 2003; Kagitcibasi, 2003, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 2003;
Miller, 2003; Rychlak, 2003; Schwartz, 2000). The following are among the key
questions that have been raised: What is the nature and role of autonomy in the behavior
of people from different cultures? Is autonomy’s positive influence only a prerogative of
Western cultures built on the ideology of individualism? How does autonomy support
relate to the psychological well-being (PWB) of people from different cultures? In this
paper, I suggest answers to these questions and provide empirical evidence that support
them.

CULTURE AND AUTONOMY
The issue of autonomy is becoming increasingly pervasive in cross-cultural
research relating to parenting and teaching (Chirkov & Ryan, 2001; Choy & Moneta,
2002; d'Ailly, 2003; Dennis, Cole, Zahn-Waxler, & Mizuta., 2002; Fuligni, 1998;
Kagitcibasi, 1996; Liu, 2005; Tanaka & Yamauchi, 2000; Vansteenkiste, Zhou, Lens, &
Soenens, 2005; Vogel & Cormeraie, 1996; Yamauchi & Tanaka, 1998),
psychopathology, (Sato, 2001), psychological well-being, motivation and other aspect
of human functioning (Alkire, 2005; Altman, 2001; Rychlak, 2003). In our modern
world, which is becoming more global and boundless, this is up to peoples’ autonomous
decisions to choose where, how and with whom to live their lives and what cultural
practices to exercise. To understand what forces stands behind these agentic and
responsible decisions that shape the life of modern societies, we need to look into the
nature of human autonomy, differentiate it from related concepts of individualism,
independence and separateness, and identify its role in people’s lives in different
cultural environments.
The existing anthropological research provides evidence that autonomy, if it is
understood as actions that emanates from one’s self, is one of human universals (Brown,
1991; Pinker, 2002) (Murdock, 1945) meaning that regardless of the country, culture, or
society wherein people live, they have a clear idea that some of their actions can be and
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should be regulated by their selves and that some of their behaviors are regulated by
forces outside their own selves. Combined with such other universals as ‘intentions’,
‘choice making (choosing alternatives)’, ‘self-control’, and ‘self is responsible’ (these
descriptions are taken from the appendix “Donald Brown’s list of human universals” in
(Pinker, 2002)), these universals create a pretty clear picture of a modern understanding
of autonomy as a psychological state which includes intentions to act, originated within
one’s self, and which most naturally occurs when a person chooses among alternatives.
If a choice is autonomous, then the self is responsible for this action and it regulates a
person’s self-determined actions according to one’s ‘moral sentiments’ and ‘world
views’ (another two human universals). But these sentiments and views have to be
internalized and deeply integrated into a person’s self in order to be guidelines of a truly
autonomous action. The logic of this reasoning leads to the conclusion that autonomy,
or, saying it more correctly, a tendency toward autonomous actions, is a part of human
nature and that we all, as members of the human specie, are predisposed to exercise and
practice this powerful capacity under favorable conditions (Alkire, 2002; Nussbaum,
2000; Sen, 1985).
Another view of autonomy stems from a constructionist position that autonomy is
a moral value which results from social construction within the network of meanings
and practices of a particular society and culture (Schneewind, 1998). As a sociocultural construction, autonomy, in this case, together with other moral values as
‘freedom’, ‘human rights’, ‘individualism’, etc., is not culturally universal as the
tendency toward autonomous actions described above, but is more cultural, historical
and society relative. The confusion emerges when the scholars who study human
agency and motivation cross-culturally reject the idea of human nature with “inherent
desires such as … love, … esteem, autonomy, … and self-expression… ” (Pinker, 2002,
p.169) and treat human motivation together with the issues of autonomy and agency as
mere cultural constructions dependent on the nature of self, which is also predetermined
by societal forces (Cross & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus &
Kitayama, 2003; Miller, 2003).
The consequences of having these different approaches applied to the issue of
autonomy could be pretty dramatic. If we accept the idea that autonomy is a part of
human nature, then, it is logical to expect that providing the opportunities for people to
exercise this ability will make them happy and fully functioning individuals in most if
not all societies. People “suffer when the freedom to exercise the (inherent) desires is
thwarted” (Pinker, 2002, p. 165). But the culture relativist approach would partly or
completely deny the ability of people within particular cultures to value and benefit
from autonomous actions (Oishi, 2000), or even further, it may emphasize that in some
societies, being controlled and exposed to authoritarian ruling “may be associated both
with behavioral satisfaction and with more adaptive behavioral outcomes” (Miller, 1999,
p. 183).
Related to these conceptual differences in understanding the nature of autonomy is
another widespread confusion of it with the notion of individualism. Researchers such
as (Hofstede, 1997; Kim, Triandis., Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Triandis, 1995)
have defined individualism as the system of cultural representations and practices where
priority is given to the individual’s needs, goals, and preferences, rather than to the
group’s needs, goals and preferences. Thus, individualism is seen a pattern of cultural
values, meanings, and practices that has been constructed through the history of human
civilizations in order to provide people with guiding rules and standards for decision
making in their behaviors. Individualism is one of several systems of cultural values
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(e.g. collectivism) which are distributed among various societies, ethnic groups and
countries. Autonomy as a moral value is one of the constituents of individualism (Lukes,
1973), and thus bounded to the cultures that exercise and propagate the philosophy of
individualism, whereas if we understand autonomy as the natural and universal
tendency of human beings to execute their behavior willingly and to fully endorse the
actions they are engaged with (Ryan & Deci, 2001), then this tendency toward
autonomous actions becomes a universal attribute of any member of any society
independently of what system of cultural values and practices—individualism or
collectivism—they exercise (Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, & Kaplan, 2003). I fully agree with
Markus & Kitayama (2003) that the meaning, the value and even the label of this
natural tendency are constructed by the socio-cultural context wherein it is exercised.
But the phenomenological experience of it and its functional role in human activity
remains the same across countries and continents. In order to be fully humans we need
to be autonomous in our actions.

AUTONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING:
A CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACH
An answer to the question regarding the determinants of the psychological wellbeing of people in different cultures depends on the understanding of the nature of
autonomy and other human motivational tendencies and needs. If a scholar sees these
tendencies (among others, the tendency to be the master of one’ own actions, to be
efficient in one’s actions and to feel related to other people, which are all strong
candidates for human universals (Baumaister & Leary, 1995; Brown, 1991; White, 1959)
as natural and universal human capabilities that need to be nurtured and exercised in all
societies, then people’s well-being is seen as a psychological state in which people’s
basic needs and capabilities are realized and adequately treated. In other words, within
this perspective PWB is interpreted as a realization and fulfillment of natural and
inalienable human potentialities, which need to be nurtured by society and culture in
order for individuals to feel happy and fully functioning (Nussbaum, 2000; R. M. Ryan
& Edward L. Deci, 2001; Sen, 1985).
But, if scientists consider humans’ potentialities to be socially constructed and
culturally relative, then they assume that people’s well-being is dependant on their
adjustment to the values and norms of their culture. Diener and Suh (2000) formulated
this cultural relativistic position in a following way: “If societies have different sets of
values, people in them are likely to consider different criteria relevant when judging the
success of the society (p. 3). By the success of the society they mean the ability of a
society to provide the conditions for accomplishing people’s own values and goals. And,
as these values and goals are predetermined by their society, the better people are
adjusted to their social environment the better should be their well-being (Oishi, Diener,
Lucas, & Suh, 1999). Thus, there are two different yardsticks to evaluate the conditions
favorable for people’s well-being across cultures: one is their nature and another is their
culture. If a researcher endorses the idea that there is a human nature, which autonomy
is a part of, then, regardless of the ideology of the society, members of this society will
be well to the extent that there are the conditions that nurture this nature. Different
societies may value these conditions differently and the extent to which they endorse
these conditions may be judged as more or less healthy for human functioning. But if
scholars believe that people’s culture shapes their potentialities, selves, values and goals,
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then, the higher the congruence between people’s personal strivings and the
prescriptions and standards that are set up by their culture, the better their well-being
and functioning. More research is needed to establish the validity of each approach, but
I personally cannot ignore the statement of a prominent philosopher and spiritual leader,
Jiddu Krishnamurti who once said:“It is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a
profoundly sick society”. These two positions: cultural universalism and cultural
relativism, with regard to the nature and determinants of people’s well-being constitute
the essence of the current debate around people’s autonomy and happiness in crosscultural psychology.

THE SDT APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY AND
HUMAN FUNCTIONING
In this presentation, I examine the above questions regarding the nature and role of
autonomy in human functioning across cultures using the Self-Determination Theory
(SDT) of human motivation, developed by the American psychologists Edward Deci
and Richard Ryan (Deci & Ryan, 1985; R. M. Ryan & E. L. Deci, 2001). This theory
has repeatedly defended the naturalistic understanding of autonomy as a universal
psychological need, which, together with the need for competence and relatedness,
constitutes the motivational basic of human nature (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, 1995;
Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). According to this theory, autonomy is a psychological need,
meaning that without nurturing it in an appropriate way, human development and
functioning will be thwarted (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The followers of SDT are the most
consistent supporters of the position that differentiates autonomy from both
independence and separateness (Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995) and the view that
autonomy is not an illusion but a phenomenon firmly substantiated by philosophical and
empirical investigations, which constitutes the very essence of our human existence
(Ryan & Deci, 2004).
SDT is a growing, empirically-based theoretical framework that postulates several
universal organismic and motivational tendencies in human beings that optimize their
development and psychological functioning (Ryan, 1993; Ryan & Deci, 2003; Ryan et
al., 1995). Specifically, it posits the existence of a fundamental organismic tendency
toward self-regulation which, according to this theory, includes a propensity toward
self-determination (or autonomy) and organismic integration. Self-regulation ideally
describes the processes through which an individual can continue to grow, maintain
integrity, and experience wellness. However, according to SDT these self-regulatory
propensities can flourish only when particular conditions are met. Specifically, one of
these conditions is basic psychological needs support, a support that the social
environment provides for the gratification of the needs for autonomy, competence, and
relatedness (Ryan, 1995). The SDT answers the above questions about the nature of
autonomy in the following ways. Autonomy refers to the natural and universal
tendency of human beings to execute their behaviors willingly and to fully endorse the
actions in which they are engaged (Ryan et al., 1995). Regardless of the culture in
which people have been socialized, they need to experience this ownership of their
behavior in order to be healthy. Different cultures may value autonomy and label its
manifestations differently; as a result the level of autonomy support in different cultures
may vary, but the functional role of autonomy and autonomy support is universal: the
more people experience autonomy support, the better their psychological health is.
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Human nature requires particular conditions to thrive. If people experience these
conditions, they develop fully and harmoniously. If these conditions are incompatible
with human nature, people may function poorly and in the long run they may be
maladjusted and they may even develop psychological pathology. Thus, it is logical to
assume that some cultural values and practices may be less concordant to the
requirements of human nature and, as a result, they will be more detrimental for human
development, functioning and health (Ryan et al., 1997). In the next section I present
some empirical evidence that supports this approach.

Autonomy is culturally universal
One of the advantages of the SDT approach to studying autonomy is that it
provides the operationalization of autonomous motivation with high construct and
predictive validity. Accordingly, the SDT researchers differentiate the continuum of
motivational regulation, which they conceptualize as a Perceived Locus of Causality
(PLOC), that ranges from autonomous to non-autonomous or controlled regulation of
various forms of behaviors: academic, sport, health, etc. (Ryan & Connell, 1995). To
assess these forms of regulation, participants are asked one question: “Why do you, or
why would you do certain behaviors?” Then, the respondents are requested to rate
different reasons for performing these behaviors. These reasons reflect different levels
of autonomy starting with non-autonomous regulation and ending with highly
autonomous regulation: external regulation (behavior is performed to get rewards or to
avoid punishments), introjected regulation (behavior is performed to get approval and
to avoid guilt), identified regulation (behavior is performed because it is important to
the person), and integrated regulation (behavior is performed because a person has
thoughtfully considered and fully chosen this behavior). The index of relative
autonomy is calculated by weighing and multiplying the scores for each reason with
greater autonomy reflected in higher scores. Numerous research projects have been
conducted using various versions of the Self-Regulation Questionnaires (SRQ: this is
how the questionnaire to measure PLOC has been labeled) to study academic, sport,
health, and many other forms of human behaviors (see (Deci & Ryan, 2002)). These
studies demonstrated the ability of the questionnaires not only to adequately measure
the level of perceived autonomy, but also to predict the quality of performance and the
state of the participants’ psychological well-being. The majority of these studies were
conducted in Western countries, mostly in the U.S. and Canada. If the SDT
operationalization of autonomy is valid, then it should reflect the universal nature of this
motivational tendency and, thus, these SRQs should produce similar results in the
countries that have a system of cultural meanings and practices that is different from the
North American culture. To test this hypothesis, several studies, mostly with regard to
the academic motivation of school and university students, were conducted in China
(d’Ailly, 2003; Vansteenkiste et al., 2005), Japan (Tanaka & Yamauchi, 2000;
Yamauchi & Tanaka, 1998), Russia (Chirkov & Ryan, 2001), Germany (Levesque,
Zuehlke, Stanek, & Ryan, 2004) and Belgium (Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon,
& Deci, 2004). The results of these projects demonstrated that all translated versions of
the SRQ-AM (Academic Motivation) were measurement and/or linguistically invariant
and were adequately understood by students of different ages and cultural backgrounds.
Moreover, these studies demonstrated that the relations between autonomous motivation
and psychological well-being and between motivation and learning outcomes were in
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the same direction as in the North American countries: autonomous motivation was
beneficial for students’ well-being and their learning performance.
Thus, these studies provided strong empirical support to the proposition that if
researchers understand autonomy as a natural human tendency to have people’s actions
be determined and regulated by their selves, then this human capability is culturally
universal and should be treated as a basic human motivational tendency.

Autonomy is not the same as individualism
If culture is considered a system of behavioral practices and meanings, then it is
possible to apply the SRQ to these practices in order to measure the level of
autonomous regulation with regard to the behaviors that represent such cultural systems
as individualism and collectivism. If this assumption is correct, then it is logical to
expect that individualistic practices could either be autonomously regulated or be
executed under external pressures. The same should hold true with regard to the
practices that represent a collectivistic system of values. In addition, if this assumption
is correct for people from different countries, then we have serious arguments toward
differentiating autonomy as a natural tendency to be a master of ones’ own behavior, as
opposed to individualism/collectivism which is defined as two sets of culturally
constructed systems of practices and meanings.
To validate these hypotheses, my colleagues and I have investigated the relative
autonomy of the execution of the four types of cultural practices: horizontal
individualism and collectivism (HI and HC) and vertical individualism and collectivism
(VI and VC) (Chirkov et al., 2003; Chirkov, Ryan, & Willness, 2005) samples were
drawn from six countries which may be characterized by different levels of
individualism and collectivism at a national level: Brazil, Canada, South Korea, Russia,
Turkey and the U.S. The participants were 828 students selected from these countries:
127 university students from Brazil, 142 students from a university in the prairie region
of Canada, 111 from a South Korean university, 159 from two universities in northcentral Russia; 94 from a university in south-west Turkey, and 195 from a north-eastern
U.S. university.
To assess autonomy, we created a special scale based on previously designed and
validated versions of the SRQ (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Our scale assessed the PLOC
with regard to the above-mentioned 2 types of cultural practices regarding individualism
(H) and collectivism (C), combined with another cultural dimension of horizontality
(H)/ verticality (V) (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). We created four
subscales, each consisting of 6 behaviors which represented HI, HC, VI and VC. Here
are some examples of these cultural practices: HI: “To cultivate a personal identity,
independent of others”; HC: “To maintain harmony within any group that one belongs
to”; VI: “To strive to work in situations involving competition with others”; VC: “To
sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the group/ collective”. Participants were asked
the standard question: “Why do you, or why would you do certain behaviors?” Based
on the SDT theorizing about different levels of autonomous regulation, the respondents
were asked to rate different reasons for performing these practices. (The full version of
the SRQ-CP (Cultural Practices) is presented in Appendix). The measurement
invariance of all scales was tested by the Means and Covariance Structure Analysis
(Little, 1997, 2000). This scale showed to be measurement invariant and reliable. The
results of this study are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Means for the Relative Autonomy Indices for Four Cultural Practices in
Brazil, Canada Korea, Russia, Turkey, and the U.S.
Relative Autonomy
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Individualism
Collectivism
Individualism
Brazil
6.11a
6.05a
3.56d
c
b
Canada
3.86
4.08
.67c
a
b
Korea
5.48
4.47
1.78a
Russia
5.18a
4.13b
2.80b
Turkey
5.41a
5.44a
3.81d
U.S.
4.62b
3.65b
0.69c
Note: Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05.

Vertical
Collectivism
5.12d
.88c
1.17a
2.87b
2.30b
-.71c

The numbers in this table represent the relative autonomy score (the extent to
which the autonomous motivation for performing particular practices prevails over the
controlled motivation) for each type of cultural practice. There are several conclusions
that can be drawn from this table. First, both collectivistic and individualistic practices
may be executed more or less autonomously. This means that some people may choose
and intentionally execute the individualistic practices of their own volition, whereas
others may be forced to do this and may feel pressured to behave individualistically.
The same conclusion can also be applied to the collectivistic practices. The data from
this table also tell us that the autonomous regulation of different cultural practices may
take place both in collectivistic (Russia, South Korea and Turkey) and individualistic
(Canada and the United States) countries. Moreover, in many collectivistic countries
the autonomous regulation of individualistic behavior may be as high as it is in the
individualistic countries. Thus, the relative autonomy indexes for HI in ‘collectivistic’
countries are higher than in the individualistic ones.
Additionally, we conducted regression analysis predicting psychological wellbeing (PWB) by the level of relative autonomy both within and across samples. As
predicted, in all samples, the higher the level of autonomy the higher the scores of
participants’ well-being were. These results allowed us to conclude that if autonomy is
understood as a universal motivational tendency, then it may be applied cross-culturally
to different countries. Independently of the country and the nature of cultural practices
that are exercised in these countries, there appears to be positive relations between more
autonomous regulation and well-being. These results support the SDT idea that
autonomy is a basic psychological need which promotes PWB regardless of the cultural
context. Our results also indicate that both individualistic and collectivistic practices
may be enacted more or less autonomously, demonstrating that autonomy as an attribute
of behavior regulation is different from individualism/collectivism, which is a set of
socially constructed meanings and practices.
Sheldon and his colleagues (Sheldon et al., 2004) used a conceptually similar
approach to study the level of autonomous motivation for the pursuit of personal goals
(which they labeled ‘self-concordance’) in samples of university students from the
People’s Republic of China, South Korea, Taiwan (China) and the U.S. The participants
were asked to generate a list of goals they typically try to accomplish in their everyday
life (the authors call them ‘personal strivings’) and they were then asked to assess their
motivation for pursuing these goals using the same format as the SRQ described above.
In addition, the standard measures of subjective well-being were used: positive and
negative affect and life satisfaction. The researchers discovered that autonomous (selfconcordant) personal goals pursuit is relatively high compared to non-autonomous goals
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strivings in all four countries. They also discovered that personal strivings’ autonomous
regulation was predictive of subjective well-being both within and across samples.
These results, although obtained by using a format that is different from those employed
by Chirkov and colleagues (2003) (i.e. self-concordance of personal strivings vs.
relative autonomous regulation of four types of cultural practices) were consistent with
the predictions based on the SDT propositions: that is, autonomy as the ‘owing’ of ones’
actions or goals is relevant to people from various countries, regardless of their cultural
membership and the concrete nature of their behaviors or goals. Autonomy, when it is
understand this way, is universally beneficial to peoples’ well-being regardless of their
country and culture.

Autonomy support is universally beneficial for people’s PWB
SDT posits that if autonomy, as a tendency to be involved in actions and pursue the
goals that emanate from one’s core self, is a human universal, then it is logical to expect
that the support that social environment (families, educational institutions, work settings)
provides for exercising this tendency should also be universally beneficial for people’s
well-being and optimal functioning.
Again, this is a very controversial thesis that is rejected by many cross-cultural and
developmental psychologists. Specifically, many cultural psychologists argue that the
role autonomy support plays in human behavior depends on the value that society
assigns to autonomy (Miller, 1999). These researchers believe that in the Western
societies, where individualism is highly valued, support autonomy is beneficial for
people’s functioning. However, they consider that support for autonomy may even be
detrimental for human development in the cultures that value collectivism, conformity
and obedience (Rudy & Grusec, 2001).
Here is some evidence that supports the SDT proposition of the universally
beneficial role of autonomy support. My colleagues and I conducted two studies on the
role of autonomy support in promoting PWB in countries that historically have been
known as relatively authoritarian and controlling toward their people (Brazil and Russia)
and in countries that are relatively liberal and egalitarian (Canada and the U.S.)
(Chirkov & Ryan, 2001; Chirkov et al., 2005). We hypothesized that despite the
expected lower level of autonomy support in the more authoritarian countries, the
functional role of this kind of support will be similar across all countries. Specifically,
we expected that the higher support for autonomy would be related to higher levels of
people’s well-being in all four samples. Indeed, we found support for this hypothesis.
In study 1, we compared the high school students (N = 236) from Russia and the U.S,
and in study 2 we compared the university students (N = 239) from Brazil and Canada.
Using the scales for assessing the level of perceived autonomy support that the students
get from their parents and teachers, we discovered that, as expected, the level of
autonomy support in the Russian sample was lower than in the U.S. sample both for
parents (t = - 2.97, p < .01) and teachers (t = - 4.18, p < .001). Brazilian students also
saw their social context as more controlling compared to Canadian students both for
parents (t = - 5.47, p < .001) and teachers (t = - 3.30, p < .001). Despite these
differences in the level of autonomy support, the prediction of PWB by this support was
universal across all four samples. Both in the Russian and the U.S. samples parental
autonomy support was a positive, significant predictor of PWB (β = .39, p < .01).
Teacher’s autonomy support was a non-significant positive predictor of the same

Culture, Personal Autonomy and Individualism: Their Relationships and Implications for…

255

dependent variable. In study 2, the support from parents in Brazil (β = .36, p < .0001)
and Canada (β = .35, p < .0001) and the support from teachers for Brazilian (β = .17, p
< .10) and for Canadian students (β = .20, p < .05) predicted students’ well-being.
These results unequivocally supported our initial hypothesis and demonstrated that
despite the differences in the perceived support that students got from their social
environment, the functional role of autonomy remains universally the same: the more
parents and teachers acknowledge children’s goals and intentions, the more freedom
they provide these children to make their own choices, the more they respect these
children’s opinions and attitudes, the better these children feel, and the happier and
more self-confident these children are.
This data obtained in various educational institutions is well complemented by the
study conducted in Bulgaria and in the U.S. with white-collar workers from state-owned
companies in Bulgarian compared with those in private American companies (Deci et
al., 2001). Specifically, the researchers discovered that the supervisors’ autonomy
supportiveness predicted psychological need satisfaction (needs for autonomy,
competence and relatedness) in both samples and that need satisfaction in turn predicted
work engagement and well-being.
D’Ally (2003), in the study of academic motivation of Taiwanese students in the
fourth to sixth grades, used the theoretical framework and operationalizations suggested
by SDT and came to the conclusion that students with academic autonomous motivation
not only prefer more challenging tasks and work to satisfy their own interests and
curiosity, but also that this motivation is mainly affected by teachers’ autonomy support
and mothers’ autonomy support and involvement.
Stewart and colleagues (Stewart et al., 2000) conducted a similar study on the role
the perceived autonomy and relatedness support that Pakistani children get from their
parents has in their psychological functioning. Despite the fact that Pakistani cultural
values strongly emphasise conformity, respect for parents and obedience as basic virtues
that have to be developed in children, and despite strong gender differences in childrearing goals and practices, the researchers discovered that perceived parental autonomy
support had relevance for both boys and girls. They also emphasised the fact that an
autonomy supportive family environment is an important condition for the internalization
of various cultural values, transmitted by parents, including the “acceptance of others’
will”.

CONCLUSION
1. Autonomy is conceptualized in modern cross-cultural literature either as a
universal and natural human tendency or as socially constructed moral values embedded
into the network of cultural meanings and practices. Depending on a researcher’s
position, the role of autonomy and autonomy support in human functioning and wellbeing across cultures is seen differently: either autonomy is a natural promoter of
people’s well being or its promoting role is relative and depends on the values that
society assigns to autonomy.
2. Self-Determination Theory provides a deep theoretical conceptualization and
valid operationalizations of the naturalistic approach to studying autonomy. It sharply
differentiates autonomy from individualism: autonomy is a fundamental psychological
need of a human organism, whereas individualism/collectivism is a socially constructed
doctrine about the relationships between an individual and society, which consists of
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various values and practices that may be more or less internalized and as a result more
or less autonomously executed.
3. The provided empirical evidence strongly supports the following propositions
derived from the SDT. Autonomy, if seen as people’s endorsement of their actions, is a
relatively universal phenomenon which brings benefits to various aspects of people’s lives
across different societies and cultures. Autonomy support includes the acknowledgment of
one’s point of view and emotions, providing options, taking another person’s perspective
into consideration, providing rationale for change or various options, supporting a person’s
initiative, and giving feedback in an informative instead of a controlling way. Autonomy
may be valued differently in different societies but the functional role of it is universal: the
more people receive support for their basic psychological needs—including the need for
autonomy—the better is their well-being and the better their functioning will be.

REFERENCES
Ahuvia, A. (2001). Well-being in cultures of choice: A cross-cultural perspective.
American Psychologist, 56(1), 77-78.
Alkire, S. (2002). Dimensions of human development. World Development, 30(2), 181205.
Alkire, S. (2005). Subjective quantitative studies of human agency. Social Indicators
Research, 74, 217-260.
Altman, M. (2001). Culture, human agency, and economic theory: culture as a
determinant of material welfare. Journal of Socio-Economics, 30(5), 379-391.
Baumaister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 117(3), 497-529.
Brown, D. E. (1991). Human universals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Chirkov, V. I., & Ryan, R. M. (2001). Parent and teacher autonomy-support in Russian
and U.S. adolescents: Common effects on well-being and academic motivation.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(5), 618-635.
Chirkov, V. I., Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y., & Kaplan, U. (2003). Differentiating autonomy
from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on
internalization of cultural orientations and well-being. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 84(1), 97-110.
Chirkov, V. I., Ryan, R. M., & Willness, C. (2005). Cultural context and psychological
needs in Canada and Brazil: Testing a self-determination approach to internalization
of cultural practices, identity and well-being. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,
36(4), 425-443.
Choy, W. C.-W., & Moneta, G. B. (2002). The interplay of autonomy and relatedness in
Hong Kong Chinese single mothers. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26(3), 186189.
Cross, S. E., & Markus, H. R. (1999). The cultural constitution of personality. In L. A.
Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research. New
York: The Guilford Press.
d’Ailly, H. (2003). Children’s autonomy and perceived control in learning: A model of
motivation and achievement in Taiwan. Journal of Educational Psychology, 95(1),
84-96.

Culture, Personal Autonomy and Individualism: Their Relationships and Implications for…

257

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination theory of
human behavior. New York: Plenum.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human
needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227268.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (Eds.). (2002). Handbook of self-determination research.
Rochester, NY: The University of Rochester Press.
Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M., Gagné, M., Leone, D. R., Usunov, J., & Kornazheva, B. P.
(2001). Need satisfaction, motivation, and well-being in the work organizations of
a former Eastern Bloc country. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,, 27,
930-942.
Dennis, T. A., Cole, P. M., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Mizuta., I. (2002). Self in context:
autonomy and relatedness in Japanese and U.S. mother-preschooler dyads. Child
Development, 73(6), 1803-1815.
Diener, E., & Suh, E. M. (2000). Measuring subjective well-being to compare the
quality of life of cultures. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), Culture and subjective
well-being (pp. 3-12). Cambridge, Massachusetts: A Bradford Book.
Fuligni, A. (1998). Authority, autonomy, and parent-adolescent conflict and cohesion:
A study of adolescents from Mexican, Chinese, Filipino, and European
backgrounds. Developmental Psychology, 34, 782-792.
Hofstede, G. (1997). Culture and organization: Software of the mind. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Inghilleri, P. (1999). From subjective experience to cultural change. (E. Bartoli, Trans.).
New York: Wiley.
Iyengar, S. S., & DeVoe, S. E. (2003). Rethinking the Value of Choice: Considering
Cultural Mediators of Intrinsic Motivation. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation,
49, 129-174.
Kagitcibasi, C. (1996). Family and human development across cultures: A view from
the other side. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kagitcibasi, C. (2003). Autonomy, embeddedness and adaptability in immigration
contexts. Human Development, 46, 145-150.
Kagitcibasi, C. (2005). Autonomy and relatedness in cultural context: Implications for
self and family. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(4), 403-422.
Kim, U., Triandis., H. C., Kagitcibasi, C., Choi, S.-C., & Yoon, G. (Eds.). (1994).
Individualism and collectivism: theory, method, and applications. Thousand Oaks:
SAGE Publications.
Levesque, C., Zuehlke, A. N., Stanek, L. R., & Ryan, R. M. (2004). Autonomy and
Competence in German and American University Students: A Comparative Study
Based on Self-Determination Theory. Journal of Educational Psychology, 96(1),
68-84.
Little, T. D. (1997). Mean and covariance structures (MACS) analysis of cross-cultural
data: Practical and theoretical issues. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 32, 53-76.
Little, T. D. (2000). On the comparability of constructs in cross-cultural research: A
critique of Cheung and Rensvold. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31, 213219.
Liu, M. (2005). Autonomy- vs. connectedness-oriented parenting behaviors in Chinese
and Canadian mothers. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The
Sciences and Engineering., 65(11-B), 6071.
Lukes, S. (1973). Individualism. New York: Harper Row.

258

Valery I. Chirkov

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognitions,
emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Models of Agency: Sociocultural Diversity in
the Construction of Action. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 49, 1-57.
Miller, J. G. (1999). Cultural conceptions of duty: Implications for motivation and
morality. In D. Munroe & J. F. Schumaker & S. C. Carr (Eds.), Motivation and
Culture (pp. 178-192). New York: Routledge.
Miller, J. G. (2003). Culture and Agency: Implications for Psychological Theories of
Motivation and Social Development. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 49, 5999.
Murdock, G. P. (1945). The common denominator of cultures. In R. Linton (Ed.), The
science of man in the world crisis. New York: Columbia University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Woman and human development: the capabilities approach.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oishi, S. (2000). Goals as cornerstones of subjective well-being: linking individuals and
cultures. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), Culture and subjective well-being (pp.
87-112). Cambridge, Massachusetts: A Bradford Book.
Oishi, S., Diener, E. F., Lucas, R. E., & Suh, E. M. (1999). Cross-cultural variations in
predictors of life satisfaction: perspectives from needs and values. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(8), 980-990.
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York:
Viking.
Rudy, D., & Grusec, J. E. (2001). Correlates of authoritarian parenting in individualist
and collectivist cultures and implications for understanding the transmission of
values. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(2), 2002-2012.
Ryan, R. M. (1993). Agency and organization: Intrinsic motivation, autonomy and the
self in psychological development. In J. Jacobs (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation: Developmental perspectives on motivation. (Vol. 40, pp. 1-56).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Ryan, R. M. (1995). Psychological needs and the facilitation of integrative processes.
Journal of Personality, 63, 397-427.
Ryan, R. M., & Connell, J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of causality and internalization:
Examining reasons for acting in two domains. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 57, 749-761.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of
research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 52,
141-166.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of
intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist,
55(1), 68-78.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2003). On assimilating identities to the self: A selfdetermination theory perspective on internalization and integrity within cultures. In
M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 253-272).
New York: The Guilford Press.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2004). Autonomy is no illusion: Self-determination theory
and the empirical study of authenticity, awareness, and will. In J. Greenberg & S.
L. Koole & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential
psychology. New York: The Guilford Press.

Culture, Personal Autonomy and Individualism: Their Relationships and Implications for…

259

Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L., & Grolnick, W. S. (1995). Autonomy, relatedness, and the
self: Their relation to development and psychopathology. In D. Cicchetti & D. J.
Cohen (Eds.), Developmental psychopathology (Vol. 1. Theory and methods, pp.
618-655). New York: Wiley.
Ryan, R. M., Kuhl, J., & Deci, E. L. (1997). Nature and autonomy: Organizational view
of social and neurobiological aspects of self-regulation in behavior and
development. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 701-728.
Rychlak, J. F. (2003). The human image in postmodern America. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Sato, T. (2001). Autonomy and relatedness in psychopathology and treatment: A crosscultural formulation. Genetic Social and General Psychology Monographs, 127(1),
89-127.
Schneewind, J. B. (1998). The invention of autonomy: A history of modern moral
philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-determination: The tyranny of freedom. American
Psychologist, 55, 79-88.
Sen, A. (1985). Well-being, agency, and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984. Journal of
Philosophy, 82(4), 169-221.
Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Ryan, R. M., Chirkov, V. I., Kim, Y., Wu, C., Demir, M.,
& Sun, Z. (2004). Self-concordance and subjective well-being in four cultures.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(2), 209-223.
Stewart, S. M., Bond, M. H., Ho, L. M., Zaman, R. M., Dar, R., & Anwar, M. (2000).
Perceptions of parents and adolescent outcomes in Pakistan. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 18, 335-352.
Tanaka, K., & Yamauchi, H. (2000). Influence of autonomy on perceived control beliefs
and self-regulated learning in Japanese undergraduate students. North American
Journal of Psychology, 2, 255-272.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Coulder, Colorado: Westview
Press.
Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and
vertical individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74(1), 118-128.
Vansteenkiste, M., Simons, J., Lens, W., Sheldon, K. M., & Deci, E. L. (2004).
Motivating learning, performance, and persistence: the synergistic effects of
intrinsic goal contents and autonomy-supportive context. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 87(2), 246-260.
Vansteenkiste, M., Zhou, M., Lens, W., & Soenens, B. (2005). Experiences of
Autonomy and Control Among Chinese Learners: Vitalizing or Immobilizing?
Journal of Educational Psychology, 97(3), 468-483.
Vogel, K., & Cormeraie, S. (1996). The role of autonomy and cross-cultural awareness
in the study of foreign languages. Iral-International Review of Applied Linguistics
in Language Teaching, 34(1), 37-48.
White, R. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological
Review, 66, 297-333.
Yamauchi, H., & Tanaka, K. (1998). Relations of autonomy, self-referenced beliefs and
self-regulated learning among Japanese children. Psychological Reports, 82, 803816.

260

Valery I. Chirkov

APPENDIX
Self-Regulation Questionnaire–Cultural Practices (SRQ-CP)
This instrument for measuring the level of autonomous regulation of various
cultural practices was developed in Chirkov, V. I. (2001). A study of the internalization
of cultural practices in college samples from South Korea, Russia, Turkey and the U.S.:
A self-determination theory perspective on culture and well-being. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY and published in Chirkov,
V. I., Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y., & Kaplan, U. (2003). Differentiating autonomy from
individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on
internalization of cultural orientations and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 84(1), 97-110.

Assessment of motivation
In this task, we will ask you the question: Why do you, or why would you do
certain behaviors?
People may be motivated to do something for many different reasons. Below there
are descriptions of the 6 everyday behaviors that you have just rated and 6 possible
reasons that can be applied to these behaviors. Some of these reasons are less, while the
others are more applicable to your typical motivation for each of these behaviors. That
is why we ask you to rate these behaviors in terms of each of the following six reasons.
Lets take as an example: ... to dress neatly. Why do you or would you do this?
(Please don’t write on the answer sheet).
Reason 1. Because of External Pressures (To Get Rewards or Avoid Punishments)
I would engage in this behavior because someone insists on my doing this, or I
expect to get some kind of reward, or avoid some punishment for behaving this
way.
According to this reason you would dress neatly because your parents, teachers,
boss, or spouse make you do so. They reward such behavior, or insist on it. Without
these external pressures you wouldn’t dress neatly.
Assess to what extent you would dress neatly because of this reason.
Use the following scale:
Not at all
because of
this reason
1

A little
because of
this reason
2

Somewhat
because of
this reason
3

Mostly
because of
this reason
4

Completely
because of
this reason
5

If this were an actual question you would then mark this number on your answer
sheet.
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Reason 2. To Get Approval or Avoid Guilt
I would engage in this behavior because people around me would approve of me
for doing so, and I think I should do it. If I wouldn’t, I might feel guilty, ashamed,
or anxious.
With this reason you would dress neatly to get the approval of people around you.
If you would dress slovenly you would be ashamed. In comparison to the previous
reason, you do not necessary have a direct outside pressure.
You would assess to what extent you typically dress neatly because of this reason
by applying the same scale, and marking the appropriate number on your answer sheet.
Reason 3. Because It is Important
I would engage in this behavior because I personally believe that it is important
and worthwhile to behave this way.
With this reason, you would dress neatly because you personally believe that it is
important for you to look neat. You consider that this is the right way for you to be
dressed.
You would assess the correspondence of this reason to your typical motivation to
dress neatly by applying the same scale, and marking the appropriate number on your
answer sheet.
Reason 4. Because It Is Thoughtfully Considered and Fully Chosen
I have thought about this behavior and fully considered alternatives. It makes good
sense to me to act this way. I would feel free in choosing and doing it, and would
feel responsible for the outcomes.
According to this reason every time you would dress neatly, you would realize why
you are doing it at that time. You would also understand that in other situations you
might dress less neatly, but in each case you would admit the consequences of your
choice and you would readily accept responsibility for your behavior.
You would assess the correspondence of this reason to your typical motivation to
dress neatly by applying the same scale, and marking the appropriate number on your
answer sheet.
Reason 5. Because It is Fun
I would engage in this behavior because it is interesting, enjoyable, and satisfying
to do.
According to this reason, it is a real pleasure for you to dress neatly. You fully
enjoy being dressed neatly and find it fun and satisfying to do this.
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You would assess the correspondence of this reason to your typical motivation to
dress neatly by applying the same scale, and marking the appropriate number on your
answer sheet.
Reason 6. No Good Reasons
Although sometimes I have done this behavior, I don’t have a good reason to do it.
Rate this reason highly if you don’t have any good reasons to dress neatly. Perhaps
you don’t care about this, or can’t do it, or simply don’t have any pressures or values
that make this a behavior you typically do. If you would dress neatly, it wouldn’t be a
real decision and you would do it without giving any thought to it.
You would assess the correspondence of this reason to your typical motivation to
dress neatly by applying the same scale, and marking the appropriate number on your
answer sheet.
Now, if you understand the task, please star.
Why do you or why would you do these behaviors?
Please remember that in answering this question we would like you to recall or
imagine situations when you behaved or thought about behaving this way and then
rate the typical motivation for this behavior in terms of each of the six reasons. Use
the following scale:
Not at all
because of
this reason
1

2

Somewhat
because of
this reason
3

4

Completely
because of
this reason
5

(This is an example of assessing one of the cultural practices)
* to help a relative (within your means) if a relative has a financial problem.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Reason 1. Because of External Pressures (Rewards or Punishments).
Reason 2. Get Approval or Avoid Guilt.
Reason 3. Because It is Important.
Reason 4. Because It Is Thoughtfully Considered and Fully Chosen.
Reason 5. Because It is Fun.
Reason 6. No Good Reason

Modified items describing four types of cultural practices
Horizontal Individualism
To do “one’s own things”.
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To rely on oneself most of the time and rarely rely on others.
To behave in direct and forthright manner when having discussions with people.
To depend on oneself rather than on others.
To believe that what happens to people is their own doing.
To cultivate a personal identity, independent of others.
Horizontal Collectivism
To help a relative (within your means), if the relative has financial problems.
To maintain harmony within any group that one belongs to.
To do something to maintain co-workers'/classmates' well-being (such as caring for
them or emotionally supporting them).
To consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.
To share little things (tools, kitchen stuff, books, etc) with one's neighbours.
To cooperate and spend time with others.
Vertical Individualism
To strive to do job better than others.
To strive to work in situations involving competition with others.
To be annoyed when other people perform better than you.
To get tense and aroused, when another person does better than you do.
To express the idea that competition is the law of nature.
To express the idea that without competition, it is impossible to have a good society.
Vertical Collectivism
To do what would please one's family, even if one detests that activity.
To teach children to place duty before pleasure.
To sacrifice an activity that one enjoys very much (e.g., fishing, collecting, or other
hobbies) if one's family did not approve of it.
To respect decisions made by one’s group/collective.
To sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of group/collective.
To take care of one's family, even when one has to sacrifice what he/she wants.
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